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 Central to the ability to recognise, respect and balance stakeholder needs for the 
board of a public corporation are the ways in which the status and purpose of the 
modern corporation are understood (Veldman et al, 2016). Shifting conceptions 
of the status and purpose of the modern corporation have led to different 
answers to the questions how, by whom, by what and for whom corporate 
governance should organise the procedures and processes that direct and control 
business. 
 From the 1970s onwards, the  ‘ Nexus of Contracts ’ (NoC) theory has become 
central in regulation, and codifi cation, in public policy and regulatory decision-
making, in accounting theory, in executive and investor practice, and in the 
 curricula of many law and management schools (Horn, 2012; Khurana, 2007; Pye, 
2001, 2002). Based on the notion that shareholders contract with executives, it 
promotes an agency theoretic model of corporate governance, in which  executives, 
as  ‘ agents ’ , respond exclusively to shareholders, as  ‘ principals ’ . In this model, the 
purpose of the modern corporation is interpreted as serving shareholder value 
creation and executive  ‘ judgement ’ is oriented towards the production of  ‘ value ’ 
as measured by short-term market valuation of the corporation (Millon, 2014). 
 The payoffs and costs of this model for corporate governance have been substan-
tial. As corporate directors and offi cers are oriented towards serving the interests 
of shareholders, corporate proceeds are progressively distributed in their direc-
tion. To provide adequate signals to the market (and ramp up their own remuner-
ation), corporate executives since the 1970s have increased dividend payouts and 
stock buybacks, while shareholders have reciprocally approved massive increases 
in executive remuneration (Lazonick, 2014). These strategies have provided nega-
tive outcomes for corporations as productive entities with a long-term horizon, as 
it materialised in the form of substantial decreases for business development and 
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 Research and Development. They also provided negative outcomes for the socie-
ties in which public companies function, as the adoption of mergers and acquisi-
tions as well as buyouts and demergers,  ‘ downsizing ’ and  ‘ divestment ’ , outsourcing, 
and restructuring resulted in massive layoffs, falling job tenures, use of zero hours 
contracts and defi ned contribution pension schemes and a rising amount of yearly 
working hours for employees. The nexus of contracts theory thus provided high 
payouts to short-term oriented shareholders by enticing managerial executives 
to engage in excessive risk-taking by adopting a strongly diminished regard for 
the consequences of corporate strategy beyond the impact of the next quarter ’ s 
 numbers; and to offl oad long-term costs of such risk-taking to public corpora-
tions, employees and states (Dore, 2008; Fourcade and Khurana, 2013; Jacoby, 
2008, 2011; Jansson et al, 2016; Kay, 2015; Stout, 2012; Veldman et al, 2016). 
 What is interesting about the nexus of contracts model, specifi cally in the light 
of its dominance as a model for corporate governance theory and practice, is that 
its main theoretical assumptions have questionable theoretical validity. A rich lit-
erature explores the problematic theoretical identifi cation of the separate legal 
entity (SLE); of claims to  ‘ ownership ’ and  ‘ control ’ ; and of the relation between 
 ‘ agents ’ and  ‘ principals ’ in relation to the legal conception of these terms (Aglietta 
and Reb é rioux, 2005; Biondi et al, 2007; Millon, 2014; Rob é , 2011). In this chapter 
I will explore these debates in the context of the understanding of the SLE, and 
specifi cally in relation to the role of the SLE in providing the  ‘ architecture ’ of the 
modern public corporation as a structure of rights and obligations. 
 I start with the historical development of the SLE as a specifi c type of legal con-
struct and its importance for the development of the modern public corporation. 
Then, I explore how the SLE provides the basis for an architecture that conditions 
the roles, positions and relations between corporate constituencies on the basis of 
a number of tradeoffs between these constituencies. I continue by looking at how 
these tradeoffs relate to the architecture of the modern corporation, and nota-
bly to the function and role of the board. I conclude by arguing that the specifi c 
architecture of the modern corporation, together with the contingent status of 
the SLE, provides a combined basis for the development of a model for corporate 
governance that can orient boards of public corporations toward long-term value 
creation in the interest of broad sets of stakeholders. 
 II. Creating the Modern Public Limited Liability 
Corporation 
 The way in which the SLE has been postulated and developed as a legal concept 
since the start of the nineteenth century provides the basis for the modern pub-
lic limited liability corporation. By providing a  ‘ reifi ed ’ construct that is attrib-
uted with ownership and liability in and by itself, the SLE conditions the public 
 corporation ’ s architecture, specifi cally by providing the basis for the emergence of 
 the board and of executive management as distinct corporate  ‘ organs ’ and by set-
ting the scope and direction of their fi duciary duties (Biondi et al, 2007; Johnson 
and Millon, 2005; Millon, 2014; Rob é , 2011; Veldman, 2016). A short description 
of the historical emergence of the modern public limited liability corporate form 
helps to illustrate the centrality of the SLE as a reifi ed legal construct. 
 The modern public limited liability corporate form was preceded by the part-
nership form, in which unlimited liability circumscribed the assumption of own-
ership and control. In the nineteenth century, unlimited liability for losses and 
debts by individuals engaging in commercial ventures was thought to be a basis for 
the  ‘ morality of the market ’ , as it was deemed to act as a strong incentive to direct 
the agency of investor-partners toward the long-term interest of the partnership 
and, thereby, to minimise the risk for others with a non-ownership stake in the 
partnership as a business venture (eg employees, suppliers, customers, commu-
nity, state etc). The risk for investor-partners of losing personal assets if they failed 
to manage business risks was the basis for the assumption of full control over 
management and strategy as a legitimate function of their property ownership 
(Ciepley, 2013; Djelic, 2013; Johnson, 2010; McLean, 2004). 
 The development of the SLE during the nineteenth century predicated an 
almost complete shift away from this model. As the reifi ed SLE was attributed with 
ownership and liability in its own right, this new construct created the basis for a 
new organisational  ‘ architecture ’ . The separation between shares and the assump-
tion and consequences of the day-to-day management of a public corporation 
turned shareholders into a largely external constituency, and entitled shareholders 
to the  ‘ residual cash fl ows of the company ’ (Ghoshal, 2005: 79), but no longer gave 
a direct claim to ownership or management over  ‘ the corporation, the assets or 
the fi rm ’ (Rob é , 2011: 31). The development of this new architecture was based on 
an elaborate quid pro quo, in which (minority) shareholders strongly benefi tted. 
The creation of a new architecture with the SLE at the heart of the architecture of 
the modern corporation allowed among other things to: remove the attribution 
of unlimited liability to investor-partners; provide legal protection for minority 
shareholders against expropriation by majority shareholders; provide protection 
against sudden or unilateral dissolving of the fi rm at the exit or death of a partner; 
conceive of shares as fully paid up and thus free-standing rights to a portion of 
the revenue stream of the company; and to separate of shares from control rights, 
offering  ‘ liquid ’ transferability, the ability to reinvest in an open market with rela-
tively little trouble or cost, a fast exit opportunity, and the potential for secondary 
trading gains (Ireland, 1999; Lamoreaux, 1998). 
 In comparison to the traditional partnership model, the development of the 
SLE into a reifi ed legal construct and the subsequent development of a new  ‘ archi-
tecture ’ for the public corporation dramatically transformed the role, functions 
and claims of investor-partners (Millon, 2014), de facto creating an entirely new 
type of  ‘ shareholders ’ . In the modern public corporation, these  ‘ shareholders ’ 
gave up direct ownership and control claims and in exchange received a large 
set of privileges and protections. Notably, this new breed of shareholders gained 
 the capacity to remain  ‘ outside ’ the corporation and  ‘ inside ’ the market, creating 
the conditions for (minority) shareholders to relatively safely orient themselves 
toward the market value of the corporation, while disengaging from the risks of 
actual management (Ireland, 1999; Ireland, 2010; Veldman and Willmott, 2017). 
 The central role of the SLE in creating a new corporate architecture introduces 
two questions. The fi rst question, which I will engage with in the next section, 
is how the SLE itself is constituted as a reifi ed construct in relation to attribu-
tions of ownership and liabilities. The second question, which I will engage with in 
 sections IV and  V , is how a reifi ed conception of the SLE relates to the architecture 
of the modern corporation. Specifi cally, I will explore how a transfer of attribu-
tions of ownership and liability to the SLE as a reifi ed construct produced a shift in 
the role, functions and claims of corporate constituencies in the new architecture 
of the modern public corporation. 
 III. The Separate Legal Entity 
 Although the SLE provides the centrepiece for a new institutional architecture, 
the precise status of this legal construct remains thoroughly unsettled. During its 
development in the nineteenth century, the SLE was initially conceived as a place-
holder that provided a shorthand to a specifi c problem of ownership and liability 
attribution, rather than a full-fl edged legal  ‘ subject ’ . Even though the SLE gradu-
ally came to represent the corporation as an  ‘ it ’ , rather than a  ‘ they ’ , it continued 
to do so as highly specifi c  ‘ legal fi ction ’ with a reifi ed status. However, the status 
of this specifi c  ‘ legal fi ction ’ gradually developed into an  ‘ extended ’ conception, in 
which the identifi cation of this construct as a legal  ‘ entity ’ provided the basis for 
attributions of (contractual) agency and (citizenship) rights to the SLE. Between 
the placeholder and the extended conception, the identifi cation of the status of 
the SLE came to relate to multiple referents, including the SLE as a functional 
placeholder or a legal  ‘ entity ’ ,  ‘ subject ’ or  ‘ person ’ ; the corporation as a whole; a 
(contractual) aggregation of individuals; particular constituent groups; or as any 
combination of these positions. As the amount of referents used to explain the 
status of the SLE and the modern corporation increased, so did the attributions of 
agency, ownership, rights and protections with regard to all these referents, further 
complicating the status of this legal construct (Naffi ne, 2003; Veldman, 2016). 
 By the end of the twentieth century, the legal understanding of the SLE had 
become so convoluted that it most resembled a  ‘ Cheshire Cat ’ . The convoluted 
status of the SLE was problematic because attributions of (contractual) agency, 
liability, ownership and rights to the SLE or  ‘ the corporation ’ could map onto a 
multiplicity of referents, and even onto multiple referents at the same time. As 
a result, the status of the SLE as a reifi ed construct and its relation to other legal 
constructs like citizens and states became conceptually unclear, providing the 
basis for broad contestation of the developing status of this new legal construct 
 (Maitland, 2003; Rob é , 1997; Veldman, 2016). Notwithstanding the ongoing 
contestation of the status and effects of the SLE, pragmatism was consciously 
advised with regard to the fundamentally unstable theoretical and philosophical 
status of this legal construct, in order to preserve its functional outcomes (Dewey, 
1926, 1931; Foster, 2006; Hallis, 1978; Lawson, 1957). 
 Although the precise conceptual status of the SLE and its relation to the broader 
concept of  ‘ the corporation ’ remains elusive, the SLE still provides the basis for a 
specifi c corporate architecture. 
 Insofar as the SLE is attributable with ownership and liability, and with broader 
attributions of agency and (citizenship) rights, it functions as a reifi ed point of 
attribution for such properties in the legal and economic systems of representa-
tion (Veldman, 2016). By being attributed with these properties and functions as 
a reifi ed construct (as an  ‘ it ’ ) in lieu of  ‘ the corporation ’ and of constituent groups 
(like the investor-partners) the SLE creates the conditions for a fundamentally 
new architecture, compared to the unlimited liability partnership form. In this 
regard, even if the conceptual status of the SLE remains fundamentally unclear, 
the  effects of the SLE as a reifi ed legal construct that allows for the attribution of 
 ownership, liability, agency in relation to the creation of a new corporate architec-
ture, and the way in which the SLE as a reifi ed construct functions in relation to 
that architecture can still be examined. In the next section I will explore the devel-
opment of the SLE as the starting point for the emergence of a new architecture 
in which the board and executive management function as corporate  ‘ organs ’ with 
their fi duciary duties circumscribed by this institutional setup. 
 IV. Corporate Organs and Fiduciary Duties 
 The SLE provides the basis for a new corporate architecture. Whereas in the 
unlimited liability partnership shareholders had both fi nancial and normative 
claims to the functions of ownership and control, postulating the SLE means that 
the assets and liabilities of the corporation are attributed to the SLE. The postu-
lation of the SLE structurally bars shareholders from access to corporate assets 
and from direct engagement in managerial functions. As a result, the nature, role, 
position, relations and claims of shareholders as a constituency are both function-
ally and theoretically repositioned and redefi ned as just one (external) constitu-
ency amongst others compared to the unlimited liability partnership (Boatright, 
1994; Blair and Stout, 2011; Ridley-Duff and Bull, 2015). Shareholders accepted 
this new position, in which they came to function as an external constituency with 
no direct affordance of rights, because it provided them with rights, privileges 
and protections that investor-partners did not and could not have in the unlim-
ited liability partnership form. Even if shareholders are afforded specifi c rights, 
eg  voting rights, rights of inspection and rights to bring derivative lawsuits to 
enforce corporate claims (Millon, 2014: 1043), by a legal or corporate governance 
  framework, those rights are not innate to the role or function of the sharehold-
ing constituency in the modern corporation. Rather, they are to be understood 
as  ‘ vestiges of an older age when shareholders, like partners, controlled their 
fi rms  … ’ (Millon, 2014: 1025). 
 The central role of the SLE and the subsequent redefi nition and repositioning 
of shareholders in a new architecture is important to understand the basis for 
the role and claims of shareholders, but also for the role of directors and offi c-
ers. The retreat of investor-partners to a disengaged and external function in 
exchange for privileges and protections effectively vacated the function of man-
agement previously occupied by those investor-partners. In the vacuum left by 
the investor- partners the board emerged as a new corporate organ endowed with 
the function of strategic management (Veldman and Willmott, 2017). As Leo 
Strine, Chief Justice in Delaware argues:  ‘ corporate law clearly vests the power 
to  manage the corporation in its directors, and not in the stockholders ’ (Strine, 
2010: 4). In comparison to the unlimited liability partnership, the function of 
 strategic management thus shifts from a council of engaged investor-partners with 
a direct fi nancial and normative claim to ownership and control over manage-
ment, to the board of directors as a separate organ of the public corporation. 
 The SLE thus puts a corporate architecture in place, in which the board of direc-
tors emerges as an autonomous and independent corporate  ‘ organ ’ with the role, 
function and discretionary space necessary to determine and implement corpo-
rate strategy (Segrestin and Hatchuel, 2011; Veldman and Willmott, 2017). As cor-
porate assets and liabilities, and later agency and rights, are attributed to the SLE 
in lieu of  ‘ the corporation ’ ; as the position, role and claims of the shareholding 
constituency becomes those of an (external) constituency, with a similar basis for 
claims as other corporate constituencies; and as the role and function of the board 
of directors emerges as an organ  of the corporation as a whole, the function and 
role of the corporate board are fundamentally directed toward the corporation, 
represented by the SLE as an  ‘ entity ’ (Aglietta and Reb é rioux, 2005; Biondi et al, 
2007; Blair, 2015; Ireland, 1999; Millon, 2013). For this reason, fi duciary duties in 
the corporate architecture shift away from the shareholders, and toward  ‘ the cor-
poration ’ :  ‘ If the offi cers are supposed to act on behalf of the corporate entity —
 which comprises more than just the shareholders — it makes no sense to conceive 
of directors ’ fi duciary duties solely in terms of the shareholders. ’ (Johnson and 
Millon, 2005: 1645). 
 In sum, the SLE provides the basis for a new  corporate architecture. The nature, 
role, position, relations, rights and claims of all corporate constituencies are 
conceived in relation to the SLE as a reifi ed construct, and their new status is 
completely different from their status in the context of the unlimited liability part-
nership. Therefore, the SLE fulfi ls a fundamental role in providing a new archi-
tecture, and the reconceptualisation of the status of the constituencies involved 
in the modern public corporate form. Once the SLE is postulated and the cor-
porate architecture is put in place, there is no way back to an ex ante situation 
without very fundamental and very diffi cult choices with regard to the nature, 
 role,  position, relations, rights, claims and duties to the corporate constituencies 
(Maitland, 2003; Rob é , 2011). Notably, in the new corporate architecture, the posi-
tion, role, function and claims of the shareholding constituency become external 
to the corporation, while the role, function and duties of the corporate board of 
directors emerge and are conceived in direct relation to the SLE, which represents 
the corporation as a whole. 
 V. The SLE and Directors ’ Duties 
 It has been argued that the specifi c legal understanding of the SLE and the redi-
rection of fi duciary duties it provides can be used to expand narrow notions of 
corporate governance. Johnson and Millon argue that:  ‘ It is indisputable that 
offi cers are agents for the corporate enterprise  … Their responsibility to any par-
ticular corporate constituency  … fl ow[s] from decisions made in the interest of 
the corporation as a single, undifferentiated entity. ’ (Johnson and Millon, 2005: 
1644). Similarly, Parkinson fi nds that corporate offi cers need to act  ‘ in the best 
interests of the company ’ (Parkinson, 2003: 493), while Rob é (2011: 32) argues 
that, executives  ‘ are not and cannot be the shareholders ’ agents: they can only 
be the agents of the corporation which is their sole principal since it is the sole 
owner of the assets they manage on its behalf. ’ Similarly,  ‘ Delaware corporate 
law, the most infl uential body of law for United States publicly held corpora-
tions, does not refl ect an agency model. Directors ’ fi duciary duties are owed not 
to the shareholders alone, but rather to  “ the corporation and its shareholders. ” ’ 
(Millon, 2014: 1035). As executives and board members are required to act in the 
best interests of the  ‘ entity ’ , the  ‘ company ’ , the  ‘ enterprise ’ , or the  ‘ corporation ’ as 
their  ‘ principal ’ , these notions provide a positive direction for directors ’ fi duciary 
duties toward the  ‘ entity ’ , which arguably represents the corporation as a whole by 
virtue of its representative quality and by virtue of its central role in the corporate 
architecture. 
 However, as explored above, the link between the entity and the corporation 
is far from unequivocal. Because the SLE provides its functions in relation to a 
multiplicity of referents, the corporate  ‘ entity ’ provides an unclear and inconsist-
ent basis for the positive identifi cation of those referents. As a result, the direction, 
alignment and mapping of directors ’ fi duciary duties toward specifi c constituen-
cies or interests is problematic on the basis of the  ‘ entity as a principal ’ argument 
alone (see Mansell, 2013). Despite these conceptual problems with mapping fi du-
ciary duties directly onto the SLE as an entity, we can still explore the  functioning 
of the SLE, and specifi cally its central role in the corporate architecture, to explore 
the status of duties in relation to that corporate architecture and its outcomes. 
 Arguably, the SLE is predicated on a legal quid pro quo that transfers ownership 
and liability to the entity. This legal quid pro quo makes the claims and interest of 
shareholders in a public corporation largely external and indirect and provides the 
 basis for an architecture in which the corporate board begets its role, functions and 
mandate as an organ  of the public corporation. As the board assumes its role and 
function, and the discretionary space to discharge its duties, by virtue of its posi-
tion as an autonomous and independent corporate organ with fi duciary duties 
to the SLE, it can be argued that the fi duciary duties of the board of directors are 
conditioned by a  negative duty to resist claims of any particular constituency that 
would come at the expense of the entity itself or at the expense of constituencies 
that are connected to and/or have an interest in the entity:  ‘ Their responsibility to 
any particular corporate constituency is only indirect, and any benefi ts (or costs) 
to such groups are incidental effects that fl ow from decisions made in the interest 
of the corporation as a single, undifferentiated entity. ’ (Johnson and Millon, 2005: 
1644). As such, the fi duciary duties of a corporate board include a positive duty 
to resist any and all direct and indirect ownership and control claims to or via the 
entity by  any constituency. 
 Moreover, in the architecture called forth by the SLE the role and function of 
all corporate constituencies emerge in relation to their role, function and posi-
tion as  ‘ organs ’ or constituent groups of the modern corporation. In addition, the 
SLE endows the modern public corporation with a large set of attributions of 
agency and rights in relation to a multiplicity of referents, which includes the cor-
poration as a whole as well as the corporate constituencies (eg citizenship rights, 
which in practice are granted on the basis of an identifi cation of the corporation 
as an entity and as a collection of individuals or constituencies with separate rights 
and claims, see Blair, 2015; Mayer, 1989; Veldman and Parker, 2012). As the SLE 
calls forth an institutional architecture that provides the basis for the conception 
of the position, role, function and claims of corporate constituencies; as the SLE 
provides a reifi ed construct that in practice functions as a representation that is 
attributed with agency and rights for and on behalf of  ‘ the corporation ’ ; and as 
the board is held to resist the prioritisation of claims by specifi c constituencies, it 
can be argued that the SLE functionally has come to represent  ‘ the corporation ’ as 
a whole. 
 By extension, it can be argued that status of the SLE as an  ‘ entity ’ can be inter-
preted  ‘ as a distinct social and institutional entity, defi ned and protected by cor-
porate law, standing at the centre of relationships involving various groups of 
stakeholders ’ (Gospel and Pendleton, 2003: 560). Moreover, it can be argued that 
the status as well as the claims of constituent groups arise from the corporate 
architecture that arises in direct relation to the SLE. As in this architecture no 
claims are originary or a priori more valid than those of other constituencies, it 
can be argued that the architecture of the modern corporation can be conceptu-
alised as a  ‘ federation ’ of corporate constituencies, and that the fi duciary duties of 
the board of directors toward the SLE are toward all these corporate constituencies 
in equal measure. In relation to the architecture of the modern corporation that 
arises in relation to the SLE, the role of the board is to adjudicate between the  rela-
tive claims of  all constituencies toward or via the SLE as the reifi ed representation 
of  ‘ the corporation ’ (Millon, 2014: 1043). 
  In this regard, the exclusive identifi cation of  ‘ the corporation ’ with the share-
holders and the prioritisation of shareholders ’ claims is problematic. Claims 
to  ‘ residual ownership ’ ; to direct contractual relations between shareholders 
and directors and/or executives; or to a status for shareholders as the exclusive 
 ‘ members ’ of the corporation, based on an implicit continuation of their role as 
investor-partners, as in section 172 of the 2006 UK Companies Act (Collison et 
al, 2014), all negate the specifi c status and role of the SLE; of the architecture that 
it puts in place; and of the role and duties of the board of directors in a public 
corporation. As such claims negate the elaborate quid pro quo that is necessary 
to constitute and maintain the architecture of the modern corporation, and the 
structure of rights and obligations that it puts in place between corporate con-
stituencies, they directly put into question the privileges and protections provided 
to all corporate constituencies — including the shareholders — by the SLE. 
 VI. Social Licence 
 Apart from the SLE, corporate architecture and a legal quid pro quo, there is a 
second reason to argue that boards of directors would do well to maintain a view 
of the corporation as a quasi-social institution with duties to broad sets of con-
stituencies (Berle and Means, 2007 [1932]). This second reason focuses on the 
connection between the problematic theoretical status of the SLE and the prac-
tical implications of the modern corporation. In  section II I explored how the 
privileges and protections provided by the SLE are based on the conscious accept-
ance of multiple, shifting and mutually exclusive referents. The broad theoretical 
ramifi cations of the pragmatism that supported the development of the SLE as a 
reifi ed legal construct are acknowledged across disciplinary domains (Biondi et al, 
2007; Bowman, 1996; Schrader, 1993; Zey, 1998). The development of this legal 
construct supported a large number of economic, social and political develop-
ments, including the development of oligopolistically organised capitalism. The 
combination of sustained theoretical unclarity and broad practical effects made 
the SLE the object of signifi cant contestation from many quarters during the 
 nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Dodd, 1931; Hannah, 2010; Ireland, 2005; 
Johnson, 2010). 
 Notably, Berle and Means, in their seminal 1932 volume  The Modern Corpora-
tion and Private Property , found that the public limited liability corporate form 
presented the means to build increasingly dominant corporate empires, resulting 
in oligopolistic economic organisation. Charting a constant increase of highly dis-
persed shareholdings in US public corporations, they argued that these increasingly 
dominant organisations were no longer under effective control of the sharehold-
ers, while other means of control, including judicial oversight or state interven-
tion, were also largely ineffective. The combination of the expanding infl uence 
and impact of the modern corporation with the weak legitimation for control 
 by a managerial cadre who were usually not investors, and a de facto absence of 
effective means of control over these new  ‘ princes ’ led Berle and Means to argue 
that the exercise of managerial discretion over public corporation was tied to a 
social trade-off. Actively attending to, and balancing, the concerns of diverse stake-
holders and providing notionally equitable outcomes for multiple constituencies 
would be central to achieving a  ‘ public consensus ’ that would continue to provide 
the social legitimacy for the modern corporation under managerial control as well 
as oligopolistic economic organisation. 
 Berle and Means were well aware of the specifi c architecture put in place by 
the SLE and its consequences (Berle and Means (2007 [1932]: 244). However, 
their argument why managers needed to maintain a social licence for the modern 
corporation was more pragmatic. For them, the broad benefi ts of the use of the 
modern public corporation for multiple constituencies, including the capacity for 
central economic coordination and, hence, oligopolistically organised capitalism, 
meant that unfettered managerial discretion over these dominant new institutions 
could only be legitimised in the long run if it would remain tied to the provision of 
 ‘ economic citizenship ’ and the upkeep of a broad  ‘ social contract ’ that would serve 
the interests of a range of benefi ciaries (Berle and Means, 1968 [1932]: 313). The 
analysis provided by Berle and Means thus built on the elements already present 
in the  legal quid pro quo and reinforced and expanded them with a  social quid 
pro qui that coupled the effects of the development of the modern corporation to 
the direction of managerial duties toward the long-term development of the cor-
poration and the interests of both corporate constituencies and broader societal 
stakeholders (Moore and Reb é rioux, 2007; Diamond, 2011). 
 VII. Discussion and Conclusions 
 I explored how the currently dominant view of the public corporation in cor-
porate governance theory, the  ‘ nexus of contracts ’ view, has typifi ed the role of 
directors and offi cers as  ‘ agents ’ who, on the basis of contractual or (residual) own-
ership claims, stand in an exclusive dyadic governance relation to shareholders as 
their putative  ‘ principals ’ . As interests of shareholders and directors are prioritised, 
those of the SLE, other corporate constituencies, and other stakeholders are mar-
ginalised (Aglietta and Reb é rioux, 2005; Bratton, 1989; Johnson and Millon, 2005; 
Millon, 2014). To assess these claims, I showed how, in relation to the corporate 
architecture put in place by the SLE, positing shareholders as a constituency with 
a right to control or management, and positing boards as directly accountable to 
shareholders (through residual claims or through contract), can only be seen as 
the outcome of a conceptual confusion, which presents a highly problematic basis 
for the development of corporate governance theory and practice, as it fails to 
explain the specifi c functions and role of the SLE; the specifi city of the corporate 
institutional structure and the specifi c privileges and protections it provides to 
 shareholders; and the specifi c position of and role for corporate boards in relation 
to both a legal and a social quid pro quo that allows for the provision of a social 
licence to the modern public corporation. 
 I showed how the SLE puts in place the basis for a specifi c corporate 
architecture, in which the role, position, and claims of all constituent groups and 
their relations are fundamentally changed, compared to the traditional unlim-
ited liability partnership model. And although the orientation of fi duciary duties 
toward the  ‘ entity ’ is problematic as a concrete basis for the identifi cation of a 
positive content for fi duciary duties, the legal quid pro quo provides the basis for 
a view of the SLE as the centrepiece of corporate architecture and for the emer-
gence of the board of directors as a central corporate constituency with fi duciary 
duties toward the  ‘ entity ’ (Johnson and Millon, 2005; Keay and Loughrey, 2015); 
and hence for a view of the mandate and role of the board as a mediating hier-
arch between the long-term claims of constituencies on the  ‘ entity ’ (Segrestin and 
Hatchuel, 2011). 
 The necessity to maintain this role and mandate for the board is related to a legal 
quid pro quo that is central to the provision of privileges and protections to cor-
porate constituencies and is reinforced by a social quid pro quo that is necessary 
to provide legitimacy to the ongoing effects of the use of the modern corporation, 
notably oligopolistic economic organisation. The combination of the legal and the 
social quid pro quo supports the argument that the duty of a board of directors in 
a public corporation is to maintain a balance between the rights, claims, obliga-
tions and protections of all constituencies inside the corporation and to provide 
long-term positive and equitable outcomes for broad sets of constituencies, both 
inside and outside the corporation (Berle and Means, 2007 [1932]; Fayol, 2013 
[1949]; Ireland, 2016; Tricker, 2015; Veldman et al, 2016). 
 In relation to the combined legal and social quid pro quo that is necessary to 
provide legitimacy to the modern corporation, directing corporate directors and 
offi cers to act in the exclusive interests of shareholders ’ interests and claims is 
highly problematic. The adoption of this notion of corporate governance leads 
to the use of the SLE, a construct with a problematic legal and social status and 
legitimation, in the exclusive service of the shareholders, who present a specifi c 
constituent group with strong privileges and protections as a result of the cor-
porate architecture, while the implications of the SLE for all other constituent 
groups are ignored. It has been argued that the nexus of contracts notion is anach-
ronistic and inaccurate from a legal point of view, leading Millon (2014: 1044) to 
ponder that  ‘ the emergence of the agency claim and its widespread embrace as 
an assumed legal requirement are nothing short of astonishing. ’ However, deny-
ing the status and effects of the SLE and the architecture it provides; allocating 
the rewards and protections of the use of the SLE exclusively to shareholders, 
directors and offi cers; shifting the risks of the use of the modern corporation and 
 oligopolistic economic organisation to all other constituencies and stakeholders 
has, arguably, been central to the capacity to extract extensive short-term gains for 
the shareholder constituency at the expense of all other corporate constituencies 
 and stakeholders (Jansson et al, 2016; Mayer, 2013; Reich, 2016). As the adoption 
of a specifi c theory of corporate governance has concrete outcomes in terms of 
 political economy, further exploration of the SLE and of the architecture it puts in 
place is fundamental to building a progressive corporate governance theory and 
practice (Veldman et al, 2016). 
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